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IN THE 
????????Court of the United ??????
OCTOBER TERM 1967 
No. 63 
NELSON SIBRON, 
against 
STATE OF NEW YORK. 
Appellant, 
ON APPEAL FROM THE CouRT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YoRK 
No. 74 
JOHN FRANCIS PETERS, 
against 
Appellant, 
STATE OF NEW YORK. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF NEw YoRK 
No. 67 
JOHN W. TERRY, 
against 
STATE OF OHIO. 
Petitioner, 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF OHIO 
BRIEF OF ATTORNEYGENERAL OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK AS AMICUS CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF APPELLEES 
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Statement of Interest of Amicus 
State of New York 
The instant cases, which will be heard together by this 
Court, all involve the constitutionality of questioning and 
limited protective searches for weapons by police officers 
who have reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has 
been .committed or is about to be committed. These ques-
tions are of direct and substantial interest to the Attorney 
General of the State of New York. As the chief legal 
officer of the State (N. Y. Executive Law § 63), c.harged 
with the defense of the enactments of our State Legisla-
ture (Executive Law § 71), the Attorney General is con-
cerned with maintaining an equitable balance between effective
tive law enforcement to protect society against crime and 
the observance of procedural due process in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. 
Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, codifying the common law, establishes standards 
defining the eircumstances lmder which citizens abroad 
in a public place may be questioned as to their activities
ties. These standards serve the valid dual purpose of 
protecting the individual from being formally charged 
with .crime without prior opportunity to explain his actions, 
and of permitting the prevention of crime before its com-
mission. The statute permits a "frisk" for weapons only 
where the police officer not only has facts upon which to 
base a reasonable suspicion that a felony has or will be 
committed, hut further facts upon which to base a rea-
sonable suspicion that he may be attacked with a danger-
ous weapon. 
We agree with and endorse fully the position taken by 
the District Attorneys filing briefs with respect to their 
defense of the New York Statute. 
539 
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Questions Presented 
1. Whether § 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution because it au-
thorizes a police officer to stop a person whom he rea-
sonable suspects is committing or is about to commit a 
felony and ask him for his name, address and an expla-
nation of his actions. 
2. Whether ??180-a of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution because it au-
thorizes a police officer who has reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a felony has been or will be committed, to 
conduct a limited search of a person only where there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that such person may 
threaten the officer with a dangerous weapon.
3. Whether § 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure is constitutional on its face, but was improperly 
applied to the cases of ????F. Peters v. State of New 
York, and Nelson Sibron v. State of New York. 
4. Whethera State court judgment permitting a police 
officer pursuant to common law to question persons reason-
ably suspected to be committing a felony or .about to com-
mit a felony and to conduct a limited search for weapons, 
evidence found being inadmissible in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding, violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. 
Summary of Argument 
I. Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure codifies the common law right of a police officer to 
question any individual in a public place where there is a 
1·easonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or 
is about to be committed. People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 
540 
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441 (1964). This power to question is a necessary element 
in crime prevention; without it, investigativeleads would 
be irreparably lost and emergency situations could not be 
properlyhandled. 
The state and federal cases upholding this right under 
common law or statute make clear that a brief inquiry 
cannot be equated with an arrest. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F. 
2d 412, 414 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. Vita, 294 F. 
2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. 
Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) , reversed on other grounds 
285 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961); People v. Rivera, supra; 
Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A. 2d 170 (1957). Arrest, 
which requires an officer to have probable cause to believe 
a crime has been committed, necessarily entails being 
taken into custody to answer for a crime, with the charges 
permanently entered on police records. Cannon v. ??????
53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961). 
A brief detention of a suspicious person enables the offi-
cer to evaluate the situation and in turn enables the in-
dividual detained to explain his actions without the 
~rubarrassment, incom·enience and expense of being for-
mally charged with crime. United States v. Themas, 250 
F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); U.nited Sta.tes v. Vita, supra; 
Canno•n v. State, supra.; K ava·nagh v. Stenhouse, 98 R. I. 
252, 174 A. 2d 560 (1961). 
II. A limited protective "frisk" of a suspect is per-
mitted under Section 180-a only where there are facts upon 
which to base a reasonable suspicion that the person being 
questioned is armed and may use his weapon. The regu-
lations issuE>d by the X ew York State Combined Council 
of Law Enforcement Officials in connection with the statute 
specifically provide: ·'Not e~eryone may be searched; 
searches are only permitted when the officer reasonably 
suspects he is in danger.'' 
Such a protective search, based upon self-preservation~ 
cannot be unreasonable and thus cannot Yiolate the stric-
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tures of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. 
Rabinou:itz, 33D U. S. 56 (1950); Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
132, 147 (1924). 
III. Since a precautionary seard1 for weapons js valid, 
evidence obtained pursuant to it can be admitted in a 
criminal prosecution. People v. R£vera .. supra; People v. 
One 1958 Chevrolet, 5 Cal. Reptr. 128, 133 (2d District, 
1960) . °Jf(tpp v. Ohi-0, 367 U. S. 643 (1961) is inapposite, 
since it is based upon the rationale that if evidence could 
be freely used regardless of how it was found, police offi-
cers might be encouraged to use unlawful crime detection 
methods. As to the instant statute~ however, an officer who 
reasonably fears danger should not and cannot be deterred 
from "frisking" a suspect. Abuses of the right to c.onduct 
protective searches pursuant to ' ' reasonable suspicion'' 
can be checked by the courts in the same manner as abuses 
by officers claiming ''probable cause' ' to believe a crime 
has been committed. 
IV. Ho,vever, assuming arguendo, that this Court 
should regard admission of evidence found in such limited 
searches as violative of the Fourth Amendment, it is re-
spectfully submitted that the stop and defensive "frisk" 
authorized by Section 180-a should still be approved and 
upheld. Defensive searches are qualitatively different 
from any other kind of search, since they- do not seek evi-
dence of crime. They are merely a necessary adjunct to 
the well-established right to make inquiry pursuant to rea-
sonable suspicion. Since this is a relatively new statutory 
conception, this Court could permit the reasonable limited 
search but fashion an appropriate rule concerning admis-
sibility of evidence. This approach has been taken by the 
Court of Appeals in State of Ohio v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 
2d 122, 214 N'. E. 2d 114 (1966) . 
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POINT I 
A police officer's power to question any person 
whom he reasonably suspects has committed or is about 
to commit a felony, has already been established as 
valid under State and Federal Law, and brief deten-
tion pursuant to this power is not an arrest. 
As stated by the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice in its Task Force 
Report on The Police (U. S. Government Printing Office, 
1967), at page 1: 
''The heart of the police effort against crime is 
patrol-moving on foot or by vehicle around an as-
signed area, stopping to check buildings, to survey 
possible incidents, to question suspicious persons or 
simply ·to converse with residents who may provide in-
telligence as to · occurrences in the neighborhood.'' 
This common law right to question-in response to 
suspicious circumstances which may not be sufficient to 
create probable cause to believe that a crime has been 
committed-has been codified in Section 180-a of the New 
York Code of Criminal Procedure. 
The legislative history of the statute indicates its dual 
function of facilitating reasonable crime prevention 
methods and protecting the individual: 
' ' Legalizing the questioning and searching of a sus-
pect so that it does not constitute an arrest is to the 
advantage of both the police and the public. When an 
officer stops a person and questions him, he is often 
in doubt whether such acts constitute an arrest. If 
they do the officer is subjecting himself and his em-
ployer to the possibility of a suit for false arrest. 
Whenever an innocent person is arrested, charged with 
a crime, and brought before a magistrate, his reputa-
543 
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tion is harmed, he is humiliated, greatly inconvenienced 
and put to considerable expense.'' N. Y. State Legis-
lative Annual, 1964, A. I. 1859~ Pr. 3025, page 67, 
Volker. 
The rationale supporting police authority to question and 
investigate was clearly set out by the New York Court 
of Appeals in People v. Rivera, 14 N. Y. 2d 441, 444 
(1964): 
''The authority of the police to stop defendant and 
question him in the circumstances shown is perfectly 
clear. The business of the police is to prevent crime 
if they can. Prompt inquiry into suspicious or un-
usual street action is an indispensable police power 
in the orderly government of large urban communities. 
It is a prime function of city police to be alert to 
things going on in the streets . . . If they were de-
nied the right of such summary inquiry, a normal 
power and a necessary duty would be closed off.'' 
It is not difficult to conceive of examples illustrating 
the urgent necessity for the power to inquire, even in 
circumstances where probable cause for arrest may not 
exist. If a police officer heard shots coming from a cer-
tain street and saw a man running from that direction, no 
reasonable person could doubt that it would be the officer's 
duty to stop the person running and determine his identity 
and the reason for his actions, rather than allow him to 
disappear. Or, if an anonymous telephone call warned a 
detective that a man with a red jacket would be setting 
off a bomb in a certain school, it would be the detective's 
obligation to question a man fitting the description seen on 
the school's premises. 
This kind of emergency situation was incisively analyzed 
by the American Law Institute in ''A Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure, Tentative Draft No. 1 '' 19'65, 
pp. 96-97 [President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
8 
and Administration of Justice in its Task Force Report 
on The Police (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), at 
p. 184]: 
''If, as some have argued, the only power to restrain 
a person, even briefly, is by arresting him on reason-
able grounds to believe him guilty of a crime, the 
police will be foreclosed from responding to confused 
emergency situations in the way that seems most natu-
ral and rational. For in such circumstances, where 
a crime may have been committed and a suspect or 
important witness is about to disappear, it seems irra-
tional to deprive the officer of the opportunity to 
'freeze' the situation for a short time, so that he may 
make inquiry and arrive at a considered judgment 
about further action to be taken. To deny the police 
such a power would be too high a price in effective 
policing and in the police's respect for the good sense 
of the rules that govern them, in order to avoid brief 
inconvenience that most innocent persons would be 
prepared to undergo.'' 
And as was observed by the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in its 
Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact-An Assess-
ment (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967) at p. 94: 
''If the police were forbidden to stop persons at the 
scene of a crime, or in situations that strongly sug-
gest criminality, investigative leads could be lost as 
persons disappeared into the massive impersonality 
of an urban environment.'' 
Some States have established by statute the right of 
-police officers to stop and question suspects for a reason-
able time. General Laws of Rhode Island§ 12-7-1 (1956); 
New Jlampshire Revised Statutes, Ch. 594, § 2 ( 1955) ; 11 
Delaware Code, § 1902 (1953); Massachusetts General 
Laws, Ch. 41, § 98 ( 1961). 
545 
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Case law also supports a common law as well as a statu-
tory right to question upon reasonable suspicion. See 
People v. Rivera, su.pra; People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106, 
293 P. 2d 52 (1956); People v. Jones, 176 Cal App. 2d 
265, 1 Cal. R. 210 (1959); People v. Faginkr(Jlfl,tz, 21 Ill. 
2d 75, 171 N. E. 2d 5 (1961); State ex rel. Branchivnd v. 
Hedman, 269 Minn. 375, 130 N. W. 2d 628 ( 1964) ; State 
v. Hope, 85 N. J. Super. 551, 205 A. 2d 457 (A. D. 1964); 
State v. Bell 89 N. J. Super. 437, 215 A. 2d 369 (A. D. 
1965); People v. Hewnerman, 367 Ill. 151, 10 N. E. 2d 649 
(1937); Hueb.ner v. State, 33 Wisc. 2d 505, 147 N. W. 2d 
646 (1967); Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64, 137 A. 2d 170 
(1957); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A. 
2d 873 (1966); Goss v. State, -- Alaska --, 390 P. 
2d 220 (1964), cert. denied 379 U. S. 859 (1964); City of 
Portland v. iGoodwin, 187 Ore. 409, .'210 P. 2d 577 (1949); 
State v. Freeland, 255 Ia. 1334, 125 N. W. 2d 825 (1964); 
State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 121 N. W. 2d 327 (1963); 
City of South E·u,clid v. DiFranco, 33 Ohio Op. 2d 215, 
206 N. E. 2d 432 (11un. Ct., S. Euclid, Ohio, 1965); 
State v. Hatfield, 112 vV. Ya. 424, 164 S. E. 518 (1932); 
Commonwealth v. Roy, 349 Mass. 224, 207 N. E. 2d 284 
(Sup. Ct., Norfolk, Mass.~ 1965); State v. };foore, -- Del. 
--, 187 A. 2d 807 (Superior Court, Del., 1963) ; De 
Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A. 2d 244 (1960); State 
v. Chronister, -- Okla-.--, 353 P. 2d 493 (1960); Com-
mo·nwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N. E. 2d 840 (1964); 
Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R. I. 252~ 174 A. 2d 560 (1961); 
People v. Beasley, -- Cal. App. 2d --, 58 Cal. Repor. 
485 (1967); State v. Dilley, 49 N. J . 460, 231 A. 2d 353 
(1967); Wendelboe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 353 P . 2d 
178 (1960) . 
Federal court decisions supporting the power to detain 
suspicious persons briefly for an explanation of their ac-
tions, have distinguished between such detentions and 
arrests. In Wils-0n v. Porter, 361 F. 2d 412, 414-415 (9th 
10 
Cir., 1966), the Court held: 
''While it is clear that at the time appellee 's car was 
pulled over probable cause for an arrest did not exist, 
it is also clear that not every time an officer sounds 
his siren or flashes a light to flag down a vehicle has 
an arrest been made. The initial act of stopping ap-
pellee 's car was not an arrest. Granting that the con-
stitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures makes no distinction between informal 
detention without cause and formal arrest without 
cau.se, there is a difference between that 'cause' which 
would justify informal detention short of arrest and 
the probable cause standing required to justify that 
kind of custody traditionally deno·minated an arrest. 
• • • 
We take it as settled that there is nothing ips-0 facto 
unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under 
circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes 
of limited inquiry in the course of routine investiga-
tions.'' 
The court made clear that there must be a suspicion based 
upon facts from which it can determine that the detention 
was not arbitrary or harassing. 
And in United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir., 
1961), where appellant was asked to come to FBI head-
quarters to answer questions, and was told that he was not 
under arrest and could leave whenever he chose, the Second 
Circuit ruled: 
''Private citizens who are detained may not, of course, 
be compelled to answer the questions of the authorities 
if they wish to remain silent. And the reasonableness 
of the time for which a person is detained necessarily 
depends upon his continued willingness to cooperate 
in answering questions. Most persons, even hardened 
criminals, will not refuse to cooperate altogether; they 
547 
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are far more likely to talk and make a pretense of 
cooperation.'' 
The District Court commented in United States v. 
B<manno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.D.N.Y., 1960), reversed 
on other grounds 285 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir., 1961): 
''I believe that the relative dearth of authority in point 
can be explained by the fact that few litigants have 
ever seriously contended that it was illegal for an 
officer to stop and question a person unless he had 
'probable cause' for formal arrest . 
• • • 
. . . It cannot be contended that every detention of an 
individual is such a 'seizure'. If that were the case, 
police investigation would be dealt a crippling blow,. 
by imposing a radical sanction unnecessary for the 
protection of a free citizen. See also United States 
v. Thomas, 250 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y., 1966; Lipton 
v. United States, 348 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir., 1965)." 
The court in United States v. Vita, supro, notes the 
advantage to a citizen who may answer questions and give 
a satisfactory account of himself without being formally 
charged before his explanations are considered. The same 
conclusion was arrived at in United States v. Thomas, 250 
F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y., 1966), where the Court held at 
pages 794-95 : 
''To the innocent person seeking to avoid the conse-
quences of arrest, a reasonable period of detention 
during which he can explain his actions and vindicate 
himself is a welcome right and but a minor incon-
venience as compared to arrest.'' 
The New York courts have also upheld this distinction. 
The Court of Appeals in People v. Rivera, supra, 14 N. Y. 
2d at p. 445 (1964), citing People v. Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600 
12 
(1915)' ruled: 
'' • • r. the evidence needed to make the inquiry is not 
of the same degree or conclusiveness as that required 
for an arrest. The stopping of the individual to in-
quire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the 
police may make the inquiry may be less incriminating 
than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to 
have been committed. It is enough for the purposes 
of this case to rule that the police were justified in the 
record as here developed in stopping and questioning 
defendant.'' 
This analysis accords with New York's definition of ar-
rest as contained in § 167 of the N. Y. Code of Criminal 
Procedure, Supp. amended 1967 : 
''Arrest is the taking of a person into custody that 
he may be held to answer for an offense." 
Other jurisdictions are in accord. See e.g. Cannon v. 
State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A. 2d 108 (1961); Cornisfh v. State, 
supra; Bl,ager v. State, 162 Md. 664, 161A.1 (1932); Hueb-
ner v. State, supra; Commonwealth v. Hicks, si"pra. 
Nor do this Court's decisions in Rios v. United States, 
364 U. S. 253 (1960), Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 
(1959), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), 
equate a stop with an arrest. In Henry the prosecution 
conceded that an arrest took place when federal agents 
stopped a car in which cartons of whiskey were then found. 
Thus, the sole remaining question was whether the arrest 
took place pursuant to probable cause. Since this Court's 
language at page 103 ("for purposes of this case") ap-
pears to confine the decision to the circumstances con-
cededly presented, there is no basis to infer that an arrest 
takes place whenever a car is stopped and the driver is 
asked to show a driver's license. Thus, the case cannot 
549 
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support the proposition that no car may be stopped under 
any circumstances without probable cause. 
The Rios case explicitly recognized the right to stop and 
question. At page 262 this Court noted: 
"But the Government argues that the policemen ap-
proached the standing taxi only for the purpose of 
routine interrogation, and that they had no intention 
to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary require-
ments of such a mission. If the petitioner thereafter 
voluntarily revealed the package of narcotics to the 
officers' view, a lawful arrest could then have been 
supported by their reasonable cause to believe that a 
felony was being committed in their presence. The 
validity of the search thus turns upon the narrow 
question of when the arrest occurred, and the answer 
to that question depends upon an evaluation of the 
conflicting testimony of those who were there that 
night.'' 
It is apparent that the idea of detention for routine in-
vestigation was accepted as· not amounting to an arrest, 
since this Court remanded the case for determination of 
the point at which arrest occurred. 
In Brinegar probable cause was found and there was no 
need to discuss or consider the power to stop cars merely 
for investigatory purposes. 
It is not difficult to predict that, if police officers are 
deprived of the right to question persons abroad in a pub-
lic place upon reasonable suspicion, they will be compelled 
to deal 'vith suspicious circumstances by making arrests 
which the courts might be reluctant to hold improper. Thus 
the standard of probable cause for arrest will be substan-
tially diluted. Ironically, this is the result predicted by 
counsel for appellant Sibron if the police are permi-tted to 
investigate informally. Logic compels the analysis arrived 
at in Gilbert v. United States, 366 F . 2d 923 (9th Cir., 1966), 
14 
where the Court at page 928 notes that substantial con-
~iderations faYor recognition of a carefully limited right of 
brief police detention on less than probable cause: 
''If even slight interference with freedom of personal 
movement is invariably conditioned upon a showing of 
prior probable cause, then either the standard of 
probable cause will be lowered, and with it the protec-
tion against formal arrests and substantial inter-
£ erences with liberty . . . or police activity which ap-
pears perfectly proper when measured against a 
standard of reasonableness will nonetheless be for-
bidden. '' 
See in accord United States v. Thomas, supra., 250 F. 
Supp. at page 796: 
"If the police seek to justify their actions as an arrest 
based upon probable cause, the dangers are great. For 
if the concept of probable cause is expanded to cover 
these necessary though ambiguous cases, the e:ff ect 
will be to widen the power of the police to visit upon 
persons the consequences of arrest when such should 
not be done. Thus the constitutional standard of 
probable cause prior to an arrest, and the protection it 
affords, will be diluted to the point that situations war-
ranting a stop~ question and detention will be con-
sidered an arrest though such should not be the case. '' 
Judicial proscription of the common law right to ''stop" 
would thus create an intolerable dilemma. Either the 
public would be deprived of the right to be protected by 
brief police questioning of suspicious persons, or the rights 
of citizens whose questioning would be termed an arrest 
(and entered on police records) would be defeated. 
Cannon v. State, s·upra. 
551 
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POINT II 
The right to stop and inquire includes a corollary 
right to self-protection. 
A recent study indicated that of the suspects questioned 
in a public place by police officers, 10% were armed with 
knives and 10% were carrying guns. Albert J. Weiss, Jr., 
''Personal and Property Searches in Radio Dispatched 
Police Work : An Overview of the Data from Three Cities ' ' 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michiga.n, 1966) pages 4-6. 
Professor Allen P. Bristow has conducted a study that 
has indicated that the failure to make a proper search is 
a circumstance in 19% of the cases in which police officers 
are shot. Bristow, Allen P. "Police Officer Shootings-A 
Tactical Evaluation'' 54 Journal of Criminal Law, Crimi-
nology, and Poliee Science, 1963, page 95. Analysis of the 
particular circumstances under which police officers are 
in the greatest danger showed that where suspects were 
stopped in Yehicles, the greatest hazard of a police officer's 
being shot occurred after his approach and while he was 
(1) issuing a citation, (2) interrogating or (3) using his 
radio (Bristow, pp. 93-94). 
552 
The risk of injury increases with the degree of urbaniza-
tion in the community. As was found in the President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration 
of Justice in its Task Force Report: Crime and Its Im-
pact-An Assessment~ supra, page 141: 
' ' Offenders from areas of slight or moderate urbanism 
in contrast to offenders from areas of extensive urban-
ism are not frequently definite criminal social types, 
characterized by criminal techniques, criminal argot 
and a definite progressive criminal life history, at least 
prior to prison experience.'' 
Even without such studies and statistics, there can be no 
valid legal basis for depriving police officers, as opposed 
16 
to other categories of persons, of the right to self-defense. 
This right can best be implemented by permitting protec-
tive searches in cases where the officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the person he is questioning is 
armed and might use a weapon against him. Counsel for 
appellant Sibron admits at the outset (brief, p. 34) that a 
police officer who feels threatened will search for weapons: 
'' . . . He will frisk to protect his life no matter what 
a statute authorizes or what the court decisions say. 
His instinct for self-preservation will dictate his course 
of action.'' 
It is difficult to conceive of how such a limited protective 
search can be called unreasonable--and unreasonableness 
is the sole basis upon which a search may be invalidated 
under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U. S. 56 (1950); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 
(1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 147 (1924). 
It should be noted at the outset that, contrary to the 
erroneous implications in appellant Sibron 's brief, the stat-
ute in question sets up a two-fold requirement. First it 
provides that the officer have facts upon which to base a 
reasonable suspicion that someone in a public place may 
be committing or be about to commit a felony. Second, he 
must have further facts upon which to base his reasonable 
suspicion that he may be in danger of life or limb if he 
does not search this person for a dangerous weapon. This 
suspicion can be based upon the suspect 's actions, bulges 
in clothing, or sudden movements. Other factors are sum-
marized in Detection of Crime, Lawrence P. Tiffany, Don-
ald :\I. ~Iacintyre, Jr., and Daniel L. Rotenberg. (Little 
Brown & Co., Boston, 1967) at page 48: 
"Whether regular patrol officers conduct a frisk de-
pends somewhat on the size and age of the suspect or 
suspects~ the crime suspected, the relative isolation of 
the area in which the stop is made, the amount of light, 
553 
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whether the officer is alone, how many suspects are 
detained, and other similar factors.'' 
To overcome the obvious difficulty in taking the position 
that officers may not prevent attack upon themselves by a 
weapons search, appellant Sibron contends that the statute 
in question authorizes not merely the limited "frisk" but 
all types of searches. The case of People v. Taggart, 20 
N. Y. 2d 335 (1967), is cited as reversing the rule created in 
People v. Rivera, sivpra, and People v. Peters, 18 N. Y. 2d 
238 (1966), carefully limiting the permissible ''frisks" au-
thorized under § 180-a. 
However, Taggart has not removed the restrictions on 
the kinds of searches permissible under the statute. The 
case involved unusual circtunstances which the concurring 
opinion of Justice Van Voorhis compared to an officer's 
reasonable suspic.ion that someone is carrying a bomb on 
an airplane. In Taggart, a detective had received an anony-
mous telephone call exactly describing a young man who 
would be at a certain corner 'Yith a revolver in his left-
hand jacket pocket. The detective observed a man at the 
location indicated, fitting the complete description given 
and standing in the middle of a group of children. The 
officer reached into the pocket described and found the re-
Yolver. The Court based its decision permitting more 
than a ''frisk'' upon the unusual circumstances-the tele-
phone call indi<>atinp; the exact location of the weapon and 
the danger to the children: 
"It would seem unreasonable to require an officer in 
that situation to engage in a preparatory and un-
doubtedly dangerous frisk-particularly in view of the 
fact that the defendant was standing in the middle of 
a group of children at the time of the search.'' (at p. 
343). 
MoreoveL the corroboration provided by the suspect 's 
location and appearance was virtually tantamount to sup-
18 
plying "probable cause" to belieYe that he possessed a re-
volver. See Draper v. U.S., 358 U. S. 307 (1959). 
The purpose of a weapons search and the method of 
carrying it out were well swnmarized in Pe1opk v. Rii;era., 
supra, 14 N. Y. 2d at page 447: 
"Ultimately the validity of the frisk narrows down to 
whether there is or is not a right by the police to 
touch the person questioned. The sense of exterior 
touch here involved is not very far different from the 
sense of sight or hearing-senses upon which police 
customarily act. 
The fact that the police detective actually found a 
gun in defendant's posses ion is neither decisive nor 
material to the constitutional point in issue. The ques-
tion is not what was ultimately found but whether there 
was a right to find anything.'' 
A$ was found by Riehard Kuh~ "Reflections on New 
York's 'Stop and Frisk Law' And Its Claimed Unconstitu-
tionality," 56 Journal of C,riminal Law C. & P. S. 32 
(1965), p. 37: 
''Customary police self-protective practice is all that 
is authorized by the 'Stop and Frisk' law: A 'patting 
down' for bulky objects that may be guns or knives, 
followed by a reaching into clothing or a turning out 
of pockets only when such solid bulges have been lo-
cated. Concealed non-bulky contraband is not ordinar-
ily legally discoverable in such a seareh; there would 
be no way of discovering it other than the rare o:ff-
chance of its being jointly pocketed with the weapon-
like bulge.'' 
The regulations issued by the New York State Combined 
Council of Law Enforcement Officials at the time Section 
180-a was enacted permit onl~· an external frisk. It is 
further provided that ''Not everyone stopped may be 
555 
556 
19 
searched; searches are permitted only when the officer 
reasonably suspects he is in danger.'' The officer cannot 
compel an an8'ver to his questions, cannot compel the 
suspect to produce proof of his identity, and must explain 
with particularity how a suspect 's attitudes and answers 
were unsatisfactory if he chooses to make an arrest on 
the basis of these answers or attitudes. An officer attempt-
ing to stop a suspect may not use his weapons or night-
stick in any fashion, but may only interpose his own body. 
Similarly, recent additions to Section 35.30 of the New 
York Penal Law restrict and define the situations in which 
an officer who has reasonable cause to believe that some-
one has committed a crime may use physical force to pre-
vent attack or escape. These regulatory and penal law 
provisions, read together with the statute at bar, all attest 
to the good faith and effectiveness of the State's attempt 
-to develop crime prevention methods which will pose mini-
mum hazard or inconvenience to the innocent and maxi-
mum standards of due process for law-breakers. 
In view of the proscription in New York law against 
police use of armed force in ''stop'' cases, it would be 
totally unreasonable and unwarranted to impose upon such 
offioors the additional burden of being forbidden to engage 
in defensive searches. As was said by Glanville Williams 
in "Police Detention and Arrest Privilege-England'', 51 
J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 413, 418 (1960), in relation to the 
power to frisk : 
"It might be regarded as a reasonable extension 
of the existing law of self-defense, or as an applica-
tion of the doctrine of nec-essity " 
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POINT III 
Evidence obtained pursuant to Section 180..a is ad-
missible in a criminal prosecution. 
Appellant Sibron admits, at pages 42-43 of the brief, 
that it is difficult to argue that the statute in question 
is unconstitutional based upon its text and the regulations 
issued when the statute was enacted. However, he argues 
that the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in 
Peters and Sibron have construed the statute in such a 
manner that it violates the Fourth Amendment. What-
ever the merits of appellants' contentions that the statute 
was improperly applied to them, the fact cannot be ob-
scured that this Court has before it the validity of the 
statute on its face, not only instances of its application 
to particular convictions. See Lovelace v. Unued States, 
357 F. 2d 306 (5th Cir., 1966); SJvuttlesworlh v. Birming-
ham Board of Ed11ca.tion, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N. D. Ala. 
1958), aff'd 358 U.S. 101 (1958); Capooth v. United States, 
238 F. Supp. 583 (S. D., Texas, 1965). 
The care with which the rights of the public are pro-
tected by the statutory language is evident in the pre-
viously described requirement that a police officer not 
only ha\-e a reasonable suspicion that a felony has been 
or i$ about to be committed, but also that he may not 
conduct a ''frisk' ' without facts upon which to base a 
rf'\asonable suspicion that he is in dang.er of attack. Thus 
there is no relation to the arbitrary general searches con-
demned in Caniara v. Mwnicipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 
(1967), ,·d1ich appellant Sibron fallaciously attempts to 
cite as apposite to this case. 
It is clear from this Court's decisions in such cases as 
Brinega.r v. U. 8., su.pra., Carroll v. U. 8., sulpra, and 
U. 8. v. Rabinoioitz, supra., that the reasonableness of a 
search must be tested by the circumstances which have 
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occasioned it. Where these circumstances include demon-
strabl-e elements of personal danger to a police officer, it 
is obvious from the standpoint of law and logic that a 
protective search is not onl~- proper but inexorably neces-
sary. State v. Dilley, su.pra.; P eople. '"· Jlachel., 234 Cal. 
App. 2d 37, 44 Cal. Reptr. 126, 130-32 (1965), cert. denied 
382 lT. S. 839 (1965); Commonwealth v. Hicks, su.pra. 
Since such a search is valid there is no reason to requir-e 
officers to discard contrahand which may accidentally be 
f ounrl in the course of such a search. 
As was held in People v. One 19:'58 Cllevrolc>t, 5 Cal. Reptr. 
128, 133 (2d District, 1960) : 
" . . . the finding of the [marijuana] cigarette was 
incidental to the precantionary SClan•h for weapons. 
The officers had the r ight to ma]-:(' ::n-1.ch precautionary 
search, and they were not required to overlook mari-
juana which came to their notice during such search.'' 
See in accord P eople '"· Rivera, supra. 
Appellant 8ibron uses tlie case of Jlapp v. Ohio, 367 
U. S. 643 ( 1961), as a springboard in his attempt to change 
New York law so that such contraband cannot be admitted 
into eYidence again~t a def<-'ndant regardless of the neces-
sity for the search through which it was obtained. How-
CYer, the rationale of 111.app is inapplicable to this case. 
An officer who-in good faith ba::;ed npou particular facts-
f ears danger to him:;elf ::;hould not <.md cannot he de-
terred from "frisking" a person detained. Thus! inad-
missibility of 0vidence ~o ohtained would not serve as a 
deterrt'nt to such a "frisk." Jlapp was predicated upon 
the fact that if evidence could be frt>l:'ly used regardless 
of how it was found, police officers would he encouraged 
to utilize unlmdul methods of crime detection. Such con-
siderations eannot he present here and! therefore! the only 
rt'snlt of t'xrluding contraband found pursuant to ;'frisk8" 
would be to permit continuation of -violations of State law 
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by suspects without changing the .pattern of police de-
fensive measures. 
Appellant Sibron contends (at p. 36) that some police 
officers will search in the absence of any need for self-
protection, in spite of the specific prohibition against such 
conduct in the regulations issued by the New York State 
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials. It should 
be noted at the outset that such an occurrence could not 
invalidate the State's right to provide for "stops" and 
"frisks". As was said in U.nited Sta.tes v. Y.ita, su.pra, 294 
F. 2d at page 530: 
"But the possibility that powers given to law enforce-
ment officers may be abused does not require Govern-
ment agents to be left powerless to make reasonable 
inquiry.'' 
The crux of the question is whether the standard con-
tained in the instant statute is sufficiently definite to pro-
dde a basis for court review which customarily and tra-
ditionally checks abuses and misuses of authority by police 
officers. Appellant Sibron repeatedly asserts that whilfl 
the standard of "probable cause" to believe a crime has 
been committed is distinct and precise, the term '' rea-
sonable suspicion'' in the context of Section 180-a lacks 
such precision. Analysis demonstrates precisely the con-
trary-both standards are eapable of similar review and 
affirmation by the courts. 
In Brinegar v. United States, s·uprn, this Court defin~d 
"probable cause" as follows (338 U.S. at 175): 
''In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very 
name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are 
not technical: they are the factual and practical con-
siderations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard 
of proof is correlative to what must be proved.'' 
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The criterion of "reasonable ground for belief of guilt" 
is adopted with approval at page 175, citing Carroll v. 
United States, supra, 261 U. S. at p. 161; Husty v. United 
States, 282 U. 8. 694, 700-701 (1931); Dumbra v. United 
States, 268 U. S. 435, 441 (1925); Steele v. United States 
No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 504-505 (1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 
u. s. 642, 645 (1878). 
And in Henry v. United Sta.tes, sitpra (361 U. S. at p. 
102), the particular circumstances are again emphasized: 
''We turn then to the question whether prudent men 
in the shoes of these officers (Brinegar v. United 
States, supra (338 U. S. at 175) ), would have seen 
enough to permit them to believe that petitioner was 
violating or had violated the law.'' 
The statute .before this Court can be judged and ap-
proved by substantially the same criteria as used in 
Rabinowitz and Henry: would a prudent man in the shoes 
of a particular police officer have seen enough to permit a 
reasonable suspicion that petitioner was violating or about 
to violate the law . . This standard is not "vague and un-
workable'' nor does it leave the permissible conduct to the 
unfettered discretion of the police officer. 
As in "probable cause" cases, the officer must indicate 
the facts upon which his reasonable suspicion was based 
(See also regulations cited infra at Point II), both as to 
his reason for stopping a suspect and as to his reason 
for frisking him. Since the standard is entirely factual 
and situational, appellant Sibron 's contention that the 
courts would always permit a policeman to conduct a de-
fensive search must be rejected. The courts would require 
the officer to justify the "frisk" on the basis of the particu-
lar situation in which he was involved and the particular 
suspect's acts. 
Appellant Sibron argues that (brief, p. 26) : 
" . . . The only possible conduct not held reasonably 
suspect is the perfectly normal.'' 
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The implication is that the statute permits invasions of 
privacy occasioned solely by non-conformity-that any un-
usual factor in appearance or behavior may be the basis 
for harassment. 
The fallacy in this argument is apparent. To say that 
normal behavior would not give rise to questions does not 
mean that the converse is true. Many forms of behavior, 
such as singing operatic arias while strolling down Fifth 
Avenue, might be unusual and unconventional, but would 
certainly not lead to a reasonable suspicion that a felony 
was about to be committed. Ultimately, the police officer's 
juclgn1ent, ,,-bile built upon greater experience than the 
average person 's, will be checked against the court's stand-
ard as to what other prudent men might have done. 
POINT IV 
The right to stop and question can be reviewed in-
dependently of the question of the admissibility of 
contraband. 
The Fourth Amendment cases which have held that in 
order to be admissible in a state or federal prosecution, 
evidence must have been obtained pursuant to probable 
cause, were predicated upon searches wholly different from 
that envisioned by the instant statute. Mapp v. Ohio, 
supra; Hoff a v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1967); 
Carroll v. United States, S'l.tpra; United States v. Rabin-
owitz, supra. However, these cases clearly emphasize the 
reasonableness of the search as the crucial factor and, 
therefore, their rationale leads to the conclusion that evi-
dence accidentally found as a result of a lawful protective 
search by a police officer must be admissible in evidence. 
Assuming arguendo, however, that the above cited cases 
were read to require probable cause in addition to reason-
ableness before evidence can be admissible in a criminal 
proceeding, regardless of the grounds for the limited search 
561 
562 
25 
in question, it is respectfully ·submitted that this Court 
should still approve and uphold the stop and defensive 
search authorized by Section 180-a. 
Protective searches are qualitatively different from any 
other kind of search. They do not seek evidence of crime 
or the fruits of crime, but are merely a mechanical ad-
junct to the well-established common law right to make 
inquiry where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that 
a felony has been or will be committed. The searches pre-
viously considered by this Court have been intricately 
connected with gathering evidence. Searches incident to 
arrest are sometimes categorized as protective, but they 
serve the equally important function of preventing destruc-
tion of the evidence of crime by the arrested person. See, 
e.g. Carroll v. U. S . supra; Agnello v. U. 8., 269 U. S. 
20 (1925) . 
No such motivation or purpose is contemplated in the 
instant statute. Search is permitted and provided for only 
because it is a necessary corollary to the right to stop. 
Police officers cannot quest!on without being secure in their 
own safety. Since this is a relatively new statutory con-
ception, this Court could permit the reasonable search but 
develop an appropriate rule concerning admissibility of 
contraband found.1 Cf. Musselman, H·ulJ-Brake Co. v. 
Comm. of Internal Revenue, 139 F. 2d 65 (6th Cir., 1943), 
where two contradictory provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code were construed; Sha.piro v. United States, 335 U. S. 
1 (1948), rehearing denied 335 U. S. 836 (1948); Clouse 
v. Am.cricmi JJ.1itual Liability Insurance Co., 232 F. Supp. 
1010 (E. D., S. Car., 1964). 
This approach has been taken by the Court of Appeals 
of Ohio in the decisions below in State of Ohio v. Terry. 
1 Even under this rationale, an indictment for illegal possession 
of weapons (as opposed to other fonns of contraband) would not 
violate the spirit of the rule this Court would fashion. 
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The reasoning of the Court (214 N. E. 2d at p. 120) was 
as follows: 
''However, we must be careful to distinguish that the 
'frisk' authorized herein includes only a 'frisk' for a 
dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search 
for contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else 
in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such 
a search is controlled by the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential. 
White v. United States (1959), 106 U. S. App. D. C. 
246, 271 F. 2d 829. Therefore, we hold that, on the 
facts presented in the instant case, the frisk for dan-
gerous weapons was valid as an incident to a valid 
inquiry by the police. Each case must be decided 
upon its ow-n facts.'' 
The Court added at pages 121-122: 
''The States are not precluded from developing 'work-
able rules' governing arrest, searches and seizures to 
meet the practical demands of effective criminal in-
vestigation and la\v enfox:cement, provided those rules 
do not violate the constitutional proscriptions against 
unreasonable searches and the concomitant command 
that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who 
has standing to complain. Ker v. State of California 
(1963), 374 U. S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726; 
Beck v. State of Ohio (1964), 379 U. S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 
223. '' 
It is respectfully urged that no possible balancing of 
interests could lead to the conclusion that vital investiga-
tory functions must be suppressed by the courts, or that 
the police officer should be required to pursue his question-
ing without disarming a suspect who in the particular 
circumstances would gh-e a prudent man reasonable sus-
picion to believe that his life was endangered. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality 
of Section 180-a of the New York Code of Criminal 
Procedure should be upheld, and the common law right 
to stop and disarm pursuant to reasonable suspicion 
should be affirmed. 
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